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LEADING A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
PETER E. QUINT†
INTRODUCTION 
In order to make sense of any sort of comparison, there must or-
dinarily be some degree of similarity among the things that are to be 
compared.  In comparative constitutional law, for example, it seems 
clear that a basic similarity in underlying principles—a common ac-
ceptance of what German constitutional law calls the “free democratic 
basic order”—is a fundamental presupposition of most contemporary 
endeavors in the area. 
Yet it is not the similarities, but rather the differences, that lend 
these endeavors their special piquancy and much of their value.  More 
specifically, it is the myriad differences, set out against the back-
ground of common agreement, that often make these comparisons 
worthwhile—because the differences represent alternative means that 
have been chosen in various systems to pursue what is essentially a 
common end.  In any event, the differences are ubiquitous:  the more 
deeply one probes into an issue in comparative constitutional law, the 
more evident it becomes that almost nothing is precisely the same in 
any two legal systems. 
Certainly a comparison of the respective roles of the Chief Justice 
of the United States and the President of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany requires us to consider two systems whose underly-
ing presuppositions are in many ways quite similar.  In general princi-
ple, moreover, the functions of the official leaders of these two emi-
nent tribunals are also in many respects the same. 
But that is indeed where the similarities end—in general princi-
ples.  When we examine the actual institutions themselves—the Su-
preme Court of the United States and the Constitutional Court of the 
Federal Republic of Germany—we see that, in many aspects of ex-
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tremely important detail, there are very wide differences between the 
institutional structures and functions of these two important constitu-
tional courts.  Moreover, as the institutional aspects of these two 
courts differ, these differences result in quite substantial variations be-
tween the roles of the two chief judicial officers:  the Chief Justice of 
the United States and the President of the German Constitutional 
Court. 
But it is also clear that no constitutional or statutory drafter ever 
focused in the first instance on the design of the chief judicial officers 
of these two constitutional courts.  Rather, the principal focus was on 
the design of the respective tribunals as institutions, and, in many re-
spects, the salient characteristics and relative power of the chief judi-
cial officers have followed rather logically from differences in the ba-
sic design of the two institutions. 
It is, of course, not the place here to engage in an extended dis-
quisition on the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many—although many readers may not be immediately familiar with 
this institution.  Suffice it to say that the Constitutional Court was es-
tablished after World War II to interpret and enforce the Basic Law 
(constitution) of the Federal Republic of Germany and that, in the 
more than five decades of its existence, the Court has developed an 
extensive constitutional jurisprudence of considerable subtlety and 
power.1  While most of the Court’s decisions are handed down in pro-
cedures that—roughly speaking—resemble the concrete “cases” and 
“controversies” of American constitutional law, the Court’s jurisdic-
tion also includes certain “abstract” proceedings initiated by a state or 
by one-third of the members of parliament, or by one “constitutional 
organ” claiming that another “organ” has invaded its sphere of com-
petence.2  A number of other differences between the two courts—
specifically relevant to our topic—will be touched upon in the para-
graphs below. 
So let us begin with the differences between the Chief Justice of 
the United States and the President of the German Constitutional 
Court—differences that grow out of variations in the respective judi-
cial institutions themselves.  As we proceed with this examination, a 
1 For comprehensive works in English on the jurisprudence of the German Con-
stitutional Court, see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2d ed. 1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994). 
2 Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 93, §1, cls. 1-2, available at http:// 
dejure.org/gesetze/GG (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).   
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number of important similarities between the two offices will also be-
come apparent. 
I.  TWO SEPARATE PANELS  
In a number of significant instances, the institutional structure of 
the German Constitutional Court seems to accord the Court’s Presi-
dent distinctly less power than that exercised by the Chief Justice of 
the United States.  One crucial difference, for example, is that the 
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany is actually 
more like two courts than one—in sharp contrast with the Supreme 
Court of the United States which, according to the constitutional text, 
must consist of “one Supreme Court.”3
As part of a political compromise entered into when the German 
Constitutional Court was established in 1951, parliament decided that 
the Court should be divided into two separate panels or “Senates.”  At 
the outset, each panel consisted of twelve justices, but since 1962 that 
number has been set at eight justices for each Senate.4
The work of the Court is divided between the two Senates accord-
ing to the subject matter of the particular case.  Thus, with some sig-
nificant exceptions, matters of individual rights come before the so-
called “First Senate,” and matters of governmental structure are de-
cided by the “Second Senate.”5  Upon appointment, each justice is as-
signed to one of the two Senates and may not ordinarily participate in 
the work of the other Senate.  Although the two Senates are author-
ized to sit together in certain circumstances (in a body called the Ple-
num),6 this joint meeting does not take place very frequently.  The re-
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
4 The German Basic Law does not actually require that the Constitutional Court 
be divided into two Senates.  Like the Constitution of the United States, the Basic Law 
provides only a few guidelines for the structure and nature of its highest constitutional 
tribunal.  As a result, most decisions concerning the Court’s size, structure, and opera-
tion were left to legislative decision.  See GG arts. 93-94.  Thus, as the Judiciary Act of 
1789 filled in many of the details relating to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
the so-called “Constitutional Court Act” of 1951 (as amended) provides most of the 
details concerning the characteristics of the German Constitutional Court.  See Gesetz 
über das Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act], 
Aug. 11, 1993, BGBl. I at 1473, last amended on Dec. 15, 2004, BGBl. I at 3396, 3403; 
DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY 86-87 (1976); UWE WESEL, 
DER GANG NACH KARLSRUHE 38-42 (2004). 
5 In order to equalize the workload, a limited number of individual rights issues 
have been shifted into the jurisdiction of the Second Senate. 
6 See, e.g., BVerfGG § 16 (conferring jurisdiction on the Plenum to resolve incon-
sistencies between constitutional views of the two Senates). 
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sult is, therefore, that the two Senates of the Constitutional Court in 
effect constitute two different courts.7
The President of the Constitutional Court is the presiding officer 
of only one of the two Senates:  the presiding officer of the other Sen-
ate is an entirely different judge, who is called the Vice President of 
the Court.  (Of the eight Presidents of the German Constitutional 
Court from 1951 to the present, six have been the presiding officer of 
the First Senate, and two have been the presiding officer of the Sec-
ond Senate.)8  As a result, any possible special influence that the 
President might wield—as President—in the conferences and certain 
other inner workings of the Court, relating to the actual decision of 
cases, is likely to be restricted to one Senate alone.  The Vice Presi-
dent may have this power—or something like it—in the other Senate.  
Therefore, one could argue that there are two “Presidents” of the 
Constitutional Court, although I think it is fair to say that the actual 
“President” does wield a degree of unique moral and practical author-
ity, as will be discussed further below. 
II.  TWELVE-YEAR NONRENEWABLE TERMS  
Another difference of considerable importance—which also may 
diminish the comparative authority of the President of the German 
Court—arises from differing rules relating to the tenure of office of 
the judges.  While the Justices of the American Supreme Court, in-
cluding the Chief Justice, are in effect chosen for life, the judges of 
the German Constitutional Court (including the President and Vice 
President) are appointed for nonrenewable twelve-year terms.9  This 
7 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 86. 
8 See VERFASSUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG 665-75 (Jörg Menzel ed., 2000) (listing the 
judges of the Constitutional Court). 
9 BVerfGG § 4(1).  This rule, which is of statutory rather than constitutional ori-
gin, has been in effect since 1970.  At an earlier period, some judges enjoyed unlimited 
terms (up to the mandatory retirement age), while other judges were appointed to re-
newable eight-year terms.  KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 88. 
 The judges of the Constitutional Court are chosen in the following manner:  half 
of the judges are elected by the Bundesrat (the upper house of the German parlia-
ment, which represents the states), and half of the judges are chosen by a committee 
of the Bundestag (the popular house of parliament).  BVerfGG §§ 5-6.  In each case, a 
two-thirds vote is necessary in order to select a Constitutional Court judge.  Id. §§ 6(5), 
7.  This rule, which effectively eliminates the possibility that a single political party may 
dictate the appointment, tends to favor judges from the center of the ideological spec-
trum.  The Bundesrat and the Bundestag committee alternate in the choice of the 
Court’s President and Vice President.  Id. § 9(1).  Three judges of each Senate of the 
Constitutional Court must be drawn from the highest courts of the “ordinary” judici-
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choice represents an alternative method of achieving judicial inde-
pendence:  even though the Constitutional Court judges have limited 
terms, they cannot be reappointed and therefore—the theory goes—
they would be unlikely to trim their decisions to achieve any sort of 
political favor with executive or legislative officials.10
The result of these shorter judicial terms is that there is a reduced 
chance for the exercise of influence by the Constitutional Court 
President over a very long period of time.  One could compare, for 
example, the shorter German terms with the recent example of Wil-
liam Rehnquist, who served for nineteen years as Chief Justice (after 
fourteen years as Associate Justice).  Indeed, during the period from 
1951 (when the Constitutional Court was established) until the pre-
sent, there have been eight Presidents of the Constitutional Court, 
whereas—during the same period—there have only been five Chief 
Justices of the United States (actually, only four, if one excludes the 
tenure of newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts).11  Indeed, even 
more extreme disparities are readily imaginable:  the period from 
1801 to 1864, for example, encompassed the chief justiceships of only 
two individuals, Marshall and Taney.  But this period is considerably 
longer than the period from 1951 to the present, which covers the en-
tire history of the German Constitutional Court and includes there-
fore the entire tenure of its eight Presidents. 
Thus, the limitation on terms of office furnishes another way in 
which the authority of the President of the Constitutional Court may 
ary.  Id. § 2(3); see infra note 35 and accompanying text (reviewing the basic structure 
of the “ordinary” legal system).  In practice, the justices are actually chosen by secret 
agreement among the political parties, and there are no public hearings on the judges’ 
qualifications, such as those that have become common for Supreme Court nominees 
in the United States.  For a discussion of proposals to limit American Supreme Court 
Justices to a single nonrenewable term, see Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Reso-
lution II:  Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (2006). 
10 In 1994, Roman Herzog, at the time President of the Constitutional Court, was 
nominated by the conservative coalition for the (largely ceremonial, but very eminent) 
office of President of the German Federal Republic.  WERNER FILMER & HERIBERT 
SCHWAN, ROMAN HERZOG:  DIE BIOGRAPHIE 223 (1996).  Thus, the eligibility of a Con-
stitutional Court judge for an eminent high office, before or after the expiration of his 
or her twelve-year term, might theoretically raise an issue of compromised independ-
ence.  Of course, the same possibility arises in the United States also, as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court might resign to accept another governmental position, as occurred, for 
example, in the cases of Justices James Byrnes and Arthur Goldberg. 
11 The American Chief Justices during this period are:  Vinson, Warren, Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts. 
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seem limited, to some extent, in comparison with that of the Chief 
Justice of the United States.12
III.  LIMITED AUTHORITY OVER ASSIGNMENT OF OPINIONS   
The Chief Justice of the United States has only one vote in the 
Court’s conference—as does each of the other Justices.  It is often 
said, therefore, that much of the special power of the Chief Justice’s 
role lies in his authority over the assignment of opinions written for 
the Court.  The Chief Justice assigns all opinions in cases in which he 
votes with the majority; the senior Justice in the majority assumes that 
function if the Chief Justice dissents from the decision.13  It is some-
times said that a Chief Justice has employed this authority to help ce-
ment coalitions, to improve his tactical position with various members 
of the Court, and to direct opinions in important cases toward those 
Justices whose views are most like his own.  It has also been said that, 
from time to time, a Chief Justice may even forego casting a dissenting 
vote and switch to the majority side (perhaps only temporarily), in or-
der to be able to assign the opinion in an important case.14
Whatever power an American Chief Justice may exercise through 
this authority (and these possible maneuvers), any parallel authority is 
greatly reduced in the case of the President of the Constitutional 
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany.  First, of course, the Presi-
dent of the Constitutional Court could possess such possible authority 
12 Moreover, in a reflection, perhaps, of the bureaucratic nature of the German 
judiciary, the judges of the Constitutional Court (including the President and Vice 
President) are required to retire upon reaching the age of sixty-eight.  BVerfGG § 
4(3).  Thus, a Constitutional Court President who is over the age of fifty-six when he or 
she is appointed will ordinarily not even be allowed to serve a full period of twelve 
years.  Accordingly, President Jutta Limbach, who was sixty years old when she as-
cended to the Court, was permitted to serve for eight years only.  KARIN DECKENBACH, 
JUTTA LIMBACH:  EINE BIOGRAFIE 173, 223 (2003); Donald P. Kommers, Jutta Limbach, 
in WOMEN IN LAW:  A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 144, 149 n.1 (Rebecca Mae 
Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996). 
 On the other hand, a Constitutional Court judge whose term has expired contin-
ues in office until his or her successor has been officially chosen.  BVerfGG § 4(4); 
KLAUS SCHLAICH & STEFAN KORIOTH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 32 (6th ed. 
2004).  Thus the formula recently invoked by retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 
the United States has long been enshrined in German statutory law.  In the case of a 
stalemate over the choice of a successor, a judge’s term might therefore be perceptibly 
extended. 
13 For a history of this practice, see G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief 
Justice:  The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1476-84 (2006). 
14 For a discussion of voting strategy on the Court, see Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy 
and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1729 (2006). 
 
2006] PERSPECTIVES FROM GERMANY 1859 
 
with respect to only one of the two Senates—the Vice President would 
have parallel authority in the other Senate.  But more important, nei-
ther the President nor the Vice President actually possesses the discre-
tionary authority to assign opinions of the Court in most instances—
even in his or her own Senate.  Finally, the fact that majority opinions 
in the Constitutional Court are unsigned, along with other differ-
ences, may affect the dynamics (and politics) of opinion writing in 
significant ways. 
To understand the full force of these points, it will be necessary to 
step back for a moment and consider the nature of judicial opinions 
in the Federal Constitutional Court from a more general perspec-
tive—because the differences from opinions in the Supreme Court are 
significant.  The first important point of difference is that in Germany, 
as in most continental countries, an appellate panel’s opinion is not 
signed by its individual author.  Moreover, in all German courts (with 
the exception of the Constitutional Court), all separate opinions—
that is, concurring or dissenting opinions—are prohibited.15  Thus in 
almost all German courts the panel speaks with an impressive unanim-
ity, even though the participating judges may have been deeply and 
bitterly split on a particular issue. 
Until 1970, this rule of forced unanimity prevailed in the Consti-
tutional Court as well.  Apparently some members of parliament had 
wished to authorize separate opinions when the Constitutional Court 
was established in 1951, but the majority was unwilling to allow this 
innovation in the German legal system.  In the 1960s, however, certain 
opinions of the Court began to reveal that there actually were divi-
sions on the panel—by indicating the numbers and views of the op-
posing justices, although not disclosing their names.16  In response to 
this not so subtle judicial pressure, the parliament enacted a statute in 
1970 allowing “deviating” (abweichende) opinions, which were to be 
signed by the author.17  This liberalizing amendment applied to the 
Federal Constitutional Court alone. 
But even after the introduction of signed dissents and concur-
rences in 1970, the majority opinions of the German Constitutional 
Court (whether or not they are accompanied by separate opinions) 
remain unsigned.  Yet, of course, there is a principal author of each 
15 SCHLAICH & KORIOTH, supra note 12, at 39. 
16 For a well-known example of such an opinion, see Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Aug. 5, 1966, 20 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 162 (F.R.G.) (Spiegel Case). 
17 BVerfGG § 30 (2); SCHLAICH & KORIOTH, supra note 12, at 38-42. 
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opinion.  That author is not ordinarily chosen, however, at the discre-
tion of the President (or Vice President) of the Constitutional Court.  
Rather, the author is ordinarily chosen according to the subject matter 
of the constitutional case to be decided. 
The system works in the following manner:  the jurisdiction of 
each of the two Senates is divided into broad general subject matter 
areas—such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, eminent 
domain, etc. (in the First Senate), and issues relating to the European 
Union, international law, the rights and structure of parliament, etc. 
(in the Second Senate).  Then the subject matter areas of each Senate 
are allocated in an equitable manner among the justices of the Sen-
ate.18  When a new justice comes to the Constitutional Court, he or 
she will ordinarily assume responsibility for certain subject matter ar-
eas that are open at the time.  Thus, each justice becomes an expert in 
specific subject matter areas within the jurisdiction of his or her Sen-
ate.19  The result is, however, that when a particular case comes to the 
Court, it is assigned to the justice who maintains responsibility for the 
constitutional area into which the case falls. 
On the other hand, there may be some overlapping of assigned 
areas.  Moreover, some of the cases may not fall into any of the areas 
that have been specified—although even under these circumstances, 
the “division of business” document may set forth detailed guidelines 
for the assignment of the relevant cases.  Yet in some of these proce-
dural gray areas, the President in his or her Senate (and the Vice 
President in the other Senate) may possibly retain some independent 
discretion.20
The justice who receives the assignment of a case—usually be-
cause the case falls within his or her area of expertise—is known as the 
“Reporter” (Berichterstatter).  The main task of the Reporter is to write 
a long memorandum on the case, called a “votum,” which ordinarily 
18 This “division of the business of the Court” (Geschäftsverteilung) is set out in 
great detail and published each year as an official document of the Court.  The 
Geschäftsverteilung document for each of the last seven years may be found at the 
Court’s website:  http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/organisation.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Geschäftsverteilung documents, 2000-2006]. 
19 Apparently, it is possible for justices to trade subject matter areas among them-
selves.  For an example, see Reinhard Müller, Di Fabio auf Kirchhofs Spuren, FRANK-
FURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Aug. 16, 2005, at 4. 
20 Geschäftsordnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Rules of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court], Dec. 15, 1986, BGBl. I at 2532, § 20(2) (F.R.G.).  Moreover, if the Sen-
ate agrees, the President (or Vice President) may choose an additional justice to share 
the task of writing the opinion in particularly important cases.  Id.; ERNST BENDA & 
ECKART KLEIN, VERFASSUNGSPROZESSRECHT 65 (2d ed. 2001). 
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becomes the basis for the Court’s opinion in that case.  When the case 
is debated in conference, however, a majority of the justices may make 
any changes they choose in the opinion derived from the votum, and 
neither the author of the votum nor the President has any formal in-
fluence over these changes.  Of course, a particular justice may exert 
significant influence on the conference by virtue of personal powers 
and abilities, and that may well include the special expertise possessed 
by the Reporter.  Indeed, this special expertise may often give the Re-
porter extraordinary authority over the opinion and result—
particularly in complex cases in which a deep knowledge of the sub-
ject matter by the Reporter gives him or her a decided advantage.21
Yet even in this system, which seems to deprive the President of 
the Constitutional Court of the influence resulting from the inde-
pendent assignment of opinions, the system may nonetheless accord a 
degree of special—although informal—authority to the President.  In 
the period before 1970, when justices were not permitted to ventilate 
their independent views by writing a separate dissenting or concurring 
opinion, there apparently was substantial pressure within the internal 
dynamics of the Court to reach some sort of decision that was agree-
able to all.  Under these circumstances, a President of the Court who 
had talents as a mediator was able to exercise a special degree of au-
thority within his or her own Senate.  The first President of the Consti-
tutional Court, Hermann Höpker-Aschoff, although not an impressive 
legal technician, seemed to possess a “genius” for such mediating ef-
forts, and his presidential role in directing the conferences of the jus-
tices gave him scope for the exercise of this influence within his own 
Senate.22  Even now, when dissenting and concurring opinions are 
possible, they are actually written much less frequently in the German 
Constitutional Court than they are in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and the pressures for a large number of unanimous 
opinions may still be strong.  Thus, it may be that a President (or Vice 
21 It is often said, for example, that Professor Paul Kirchhof of Heidelberg, who 
was a judge of the Second Senate from 1987 to 1999, was able to insert several of his 
own distinctive constitutional and economic theories into the Court’s opinions in tax 
cases, as well as in the Court’s important decision on the European Union’s Maastricht 
Treaty.  WESEL, supra note 4, at 297-302, 362-65.  Kirchhof was the Reporter in these 
cases, and his influence seemed particularly strong in his areas of expertise. 
22 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 188-89.  In the United States, 
Chief Justice Marshall appears to have been able to exercise a similar unifying influ-
ence, particularly in the earlier years of his tenure when most decisions were unani-
mous and were announced in opinions written by the Chief Justice himself.  Charles F. 
Hobson, Defining the Office:  John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1426-
31 (2006). 
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President) of the Constitutional Court, with exceptional talents for 
mediation, may continue to play an especially influential role in the 
councils of his or her particular Senate. 
IV.  THE COURT’S SCREENING COMMITTEES 
  The role of the President of the Constitutional Court is also af-
fected—and in this case perhaps somewhat enhanced—by an impor-
tant difference in the procedure of decisionmaking in the Constitu-
tional Court, in contrast with that of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  This difference concerns the process of screening cases in the 
Constitutional Court. 
Each year litigants file more than five thousand Constitutional 
Complaints asking the Court to invalidate a wide variety of govern-
mental actions.23  Of course, only a very small fraction of these Com-
plaints can be decided in full Senate opinions.  Yet the Court’s proce-
dure still reflects the strongly held and perhaps quixotic view—dating 
back to the era of the Court’s origins—that every person filing a Con-
stitutional Complaint is, in principle, entitled to a decision on the 
merits.  Such a commitment has made it impossible, up until now, for 
the Court to adopt a discretionary review system such as the certiorari 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
As a result, the overwhelming majority of decisions of the Consti-
tutional Court are not rendered by a full Senate, but rather by three-
judge committees (Kammern) whose task is to screen and decide most 
of these Constitutional Complaints.24  These screening committees 
function in the following manner:  if a committee finds that a Consti-
tutional Complaint is clearly without merit—or if it is otherwise unac-
ceptable on certain other grounds—the committee dismisses the 
Complaint.  If, in contrast, the committee finds that the Complaint is 
clearly meritorious, it may issue a decision in favor of the complain-
ant.  In both kinds of cases, the committee’s decision must be unani-
mous, and it is unreviewable. 
The opinions written by the committees may be summary in na-
ture, but they can also be long and complex under some circum-
stances.  These committee decisions are obviously less authoritative 
than full Senate decisions, and they are ordinarily not included in the 
official reports of the Constitutional Court.  In important instances, 
23 SCHLAICH & KORIOTH, supra note 12, at 59. 
24 Id. at 58-59. 
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however, these opinions are reprinted (in edited form) in German law 
journals.25  It is only if a Constitutional Complaint falls in the gray area 
between a clearly non-meritorious and a clearly meritorious claim that 
the screening committee sends the Complaint to the full Senate for 
additional screening and possible decision. 
Thus, the screening committees of the German Constitutional 
Court play a subsidiary, but nonetheless important, role in the devel-
opment of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.  They in-
deed can play a substantive role in the development of doctrine—
unlike the certiorari procedure, which serves the function of screen-
ing cases in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
There are usually three of these three-judge screening committees 
in each of the two Senates of the Constitutional Court.  “As there are 
only eight judges on each Senate, it is clear that one judge in each 
Senate must serve on two screening committees.”26  Invariably in re-
cent years the President has served on two of the screening commit-
tees in his or her Senate.27  To this extent, then, the process of screen-
ing gives an additional vote in these committees to the President of 
the Court, and therefore—to some perhaps unknowable degree—may 
accord the President somewhat more influence in the decision of a 
large number of Constitutional Complaints on this secondary level of 
the Court’s adjudication. 
On the other hand, in light of this increased committee work as 
well as other important administrative duties, the President ends up 
writing significantly fewer opinions as Reporter for the full Senate 
than the average number written by the other judges.28  So to the ex-
tent that the Reporter has special influence over the decisions of the 
full Senate, it could be the case that, in this respect, the President’s in-
fluence is somewhat diminished. 
25 In addition, the initial volumes of a new series of reporters, reprinting selected 
opinions of the screening committees, have recently appeared.  1-6 BVERFGK, KAM-
MERENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS. EINE AUSWAHL (Verein der 
Richter des Bundesverfassungsgerichts ed., 2004-2006). 
26 FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 181.  In a relatively small number of in-
stances, the Second Senate has created four screening committees instead of three; in 
such cases, of course, an additional number of judges must each sit on two screening 
committees. 
27 Id.; Geschäftsverteilung documents, 2000-2006 supra note 18; Geschäftsverteilung 
documents 1990-1999 (on file with author). 
28 FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 183. 
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V.  AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
  The official title of the American Chief Justice is “Chief Justice of 
the United States”—not, as it is sometimes stated, “Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court.”  Whatever this appellation may have meant in earlier 
periods, the American Chief Justice has assumed considerable respon-
sibility not only for the administration of the Supreme Court, but as 
leader of the federal judiciary in general.  Thus, the Chief Justice pre-
pares an annual report on the state of the federal judiciary, and is of-
ten an advocate before Congress for funding and resources, not only 
for the Supreme Court but for all of the federal courts.  Moreover, the 
Chief Justice is chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, a general governing body of the federal courts,29 and he has, or 
has had, other statutory authority over aspects of the federal courts.  
For example, the Chief Justice is authorized by statute to choose—
from among the federal judiciary—the judges who are to sit on the 
special courts established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.30  Several commentators have argued that this collection of statu-
tory authorities actually gives the Chief Justice an extended—and in-
deed inappropriate—degree of practical power, which may be exer-
cised without the checks and limitations that are ordinarily present in 
the more traditional aspects of the judicial function.31
This sort of general judicial leadership role is largely absent in the 
case of the President of the German Constitutional Court.  Of course, 
the President is the chief administrative officer of the Constitutional 
Court itself, and he supervises its large corps of employees.  Indeed, 
29 The Judicial Conference was established by Congress at the urging of Chief Jus-
tice Taft, whose campaign to modernize the federal judiciary has been called his great-
est accomplishment as Chief Justice.  JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, THE SUPREME 
COURT AT WORK 92-93 (2d ed. 1997). 
30 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000).  Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, a statute 
that is no longer in effect, the Chief Justice also had statutory authority to appoint the 
members of a special court (known as the Special Division), which was to supervise the 
work of “independent counsel” appointed under that Act.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 660-61 & n.3 (1988). 
31 See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341, 390 (2004) (arguing that exclusive authority vested in the 
Chief Justice to make appointments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance courts 
and other special courts is “problematic,” because there is no way to “prevent the Chief 
from exercising that power in a strategic way to affect outcomes”); Judith Resnik, The 
Programmatic Judiciary:  Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 285-88 (2000) (noting the “enormous influence” of the Chief 
Justice in selecting committees of the Judicial Conference, which may in turn deter-
mine influential recommendations of the Conference to Congress). 
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this administrative authority seems to extend to rather complete con-
trol over many matters of detail:  “Most policies having to do with re-
cruitment of nonjudicial personnel, allocation of secretarial assistance 
and office facilities, provision and supervision of law clerks, decisions 
on hours and conditions of work, purchase of books and supplies, and 
the use of the Court’s transportation pool are made by the Presi-
dent.”32  The President also has the authority to appoint an official 
called the Constitutional Court Director, who reports to the President 
and exercises day-to-day responsibility over these administrative mat-
ters.33
Yet, for important theoretical reasons, it is most unlikely that the 
President of the Constitutional Court could have any general respon-
sibility for any of the other German courts.  The reasons for this strik-
ing contrast with the role of the American Chief Justice lead us into a 
brief consideration of the nature of the German judiciary, as well as 
the origins of the German Constitutional Court. 
Taking a lead from the antijudicial ideology of the French Revolu-
tion, the states of Western Europe in the nineteenth century (includ-
ing Germany) developed a view of judges that seemed rather distinct 
from the view of common law judges that prevailed in the Anglo-
American world.  The continental view emphasized the centrality of 
the written law—the statutes or codes—and judges were often viewed 
as quasi-bureaucrats who should be able to deliver syllogistic opinions 
derived in a logical manner from the applicable rule of law and the 
facts of the case.  Under this view—perhaps realized more fully in 
France than in Germany—the judges were to reason according to very 
specific and narrowly defined techniques, in contrast with the (per-
haps chaotic) creativity that could sometimes be expected in the 
common law system. 
Thus, when it came to the question of establishing a Constitu-
tional Court—first in Austria in the 1920s, and later in Germany after 
World War II—most experts believed that the new tribunal would be 
called upon to hand down quasi-political decisions that would be fun-
damentally different in nature from the judgments issued by the 
32 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 91-92.  On the other hand, the 
Court’s Plenum—the joint meeting of the two Senates—retains some authority over 
more general administrative questions.  BENDA & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 70. 
33 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 92, 94-95; BENDA & KLEIN, supra 
note 20, at 72.  Indeed, the Director can be a very important official within the Court, 
as exemplified, for example, by the career of Dr. Karl-Georg Zierlein (the Director un-
der Roman Herzog), who was known as the Court’s “gray eminence.”  FILMER & 
SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 196-97. 
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courts of the “ordinary” civil and criminal law.  Moreover, it was 
thought that years of immersion in the technical and narrowly legal 
methods of the ordinary law were not likely to produce personalities 
who would be able, when necessary, to confront and overrule actions 
of the legislative or executive branches.  Others thought—perhaps in 
contradiction with the foregoing view—that the judges of the ordinary 
law had been too forceful in asserting monarchist or right-wing posi-
tions against democratic governmental measures under the Weimar 
Republic (1919-1933).34
Therefore, following a pattern that had been developed by Hans 
Kelsen in Austria in the 1920s, the German Constitutional Court was 
basically established outside of the general legal system.  Although the 
Constitutional Court of course must have important points of contact 
with the “ordinary” legal system, it is not a part of that system.35  For 
example, the Constitutional Court, which is basically limited to the 
decision of constitutional questions, has no power to set down au-
thoritative interpretations of federal statutes or to decide any other 
questions of the “ordinary” law. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court is a court almost exclusively for 
constitutional matters, which is placed outside of the system of the or-
dinary courts and the ordinary law—a position that contrasts substan-
tially with that of the Supreme Court of the United States, which basi-
cally has jurisdiction not only over questions of constitutional law, but 
also over all other questions of federal law.  In this light, it would be a 
sort of structural solecism for the President of the Constitutional 
Court—the chief officer of a court that lies outside of the general 
German judicial system—to be considered the head of the “ordinary” 
German judiciary as well. 
Moreover, there is another difference in the structure of the 
German courts that would make such authority most unlikely if not 
impossible.  In contrast with the United States and its extensive system 
of federal courts on the trial and appellate levels of adjudication, 
there are actually very few federal courts in Germany.  Indeed, with a 
few minor exceptions, the only German “federal” courts are the five 
“supreme courts” which are placed at the top of the five separate areas 
34 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 75. 
35 Rather, the system of “ordinary” law is divided up into five separate and parallel 
court structures, which adjudicate five separate specialized legal areas.  These five areas 
are:  (1) civil and criminal law; (2) employment law; (3) administrative law; (4) social 
security law; and (5) tax law.  At the top of each of these five systems is a federal su-
preme court which controls the interpretation of law in its specific area. 
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of “ordinary” adjudication.36  The various levels of lower courts in all 
of these five areas are state courts, directed by the state governments 
and state ministries of justice—even though they are reviewed at the 
top by the five federal “supreme courts,” and even though most of the 
law that these state courts apply is federal law.  That the lower courts 
in all five areas are state courts parallels a broader principle of the 
German constitutional system, which largely avoids administration of 
law on the federal level.  Rather, the administration of federal statutes 
is largely undertaken by the states, and the creation of the lower 
courts as state courts parallels this broader bureaucratic structure. 
Thus, while the President of the German Constitutional Court is 
the administrative chief of that court, his or her responsibility does 
not ordinarily extend beyond that role into the other structures of the 
German judiciary.  It is perhaps in this characteristic that the more 
modest nature of the office of the President of the German Constitu-
tional Court—in contrast with that of the American Chief Justice—is 
most readily apparent. 
VI.  INFORMAL INFLUENCE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COURT   
Yet probably the most important role of the President of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court—and perhaps that of the Chief Justice of 
the United States, as well—lies in the opportunities for informal influ-
ence both within the Court and outside of the Court.  On the one 
hand, of course, the institution of unsigned majority opinions (as well 
as assignment in accordance with expertise) will deprive the President 
of the German Constitutional Court of the possibility of signaling par-
ticularly important decisions by virtue of his or her authorship.  In this 
way, the President loses the representative possibilities exploited so 
fully by American Chief Justices, such as Chief Justice Marshall in nu-
merous opinions for the Court, Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board 
of Education37 and Reynolds v. Sims,38 Chief Justice Burger in United 
States v. Nixon,39 and (to take a disastrous example) Chief Justice 
Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford.40  Moreover—in part because of the 
practice of unsigned majority opinions, and in part because of the 
36 See supra note 35.  Of course, the Federal Constitutional Court itself is also a 
“federal” court. 
37 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
38 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
39 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
40 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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general nature of legal and social culture in Germany—the judges of 
the German Constitutional Court (including the President) are gen-
erally not nearly as well known in Germany as their counterparts on 
the Supreme Court are known in the United States. 
On the other hand, as we have seen, the institution of unsigned 
majority opinions may yield pressures within the Court that give the 
President particular scope (within one Senate, at least) for the exer-
cise of mediating powers, if he or she has—as President Höpker-
Aschoff apparently had—a “genius” in the skills of mediation. 
From time to time in the history of the Constitutional Court, 
moreover, the President of the Court has played an important repre-
sentative role in public controversies concerning the Court, and in 
struggles with other political forces.  In certain of these instances, the 
representative role of the Court’s President seems to have, if anything, 
exceeded similar activities by the Chief Justice of the United States.  
Let us focus on two important examples of this phenomenon. 
In the early 1950s—almost at the outset of its existence—the Con-
stitutional Court was engaged in a political struggle with the Adenauer 
government over issues having to do with the constitutionality of a 
proposed plan for integrating European military forces.  At the same 
time, the Court was embroiled with the Federal Justice Ministry over 
the hotly contested question of whether the Constitutional Court 
should be treated as a separate “constitutional organ”—on the level of 
the federal government, the federal parliament, and the federal Presi-
dent—or whether, on the contrary, it should be administratively 
treated as just another court, subject to the budgetary and other su-
pervision of the Ministry of Justice.41
In these disputes, the Court’s first President, Hermann Höpker-
Aschoff, played a significant role through public debate and internal 
governmental pressure.  Indeed, President Höpker-Aschoff informed 
Chancellor Adenauer and Federal President Heuss that he would re-
sign if a particularly hostile Justice Minster, who had bitterly attacked 
the Court, were reappointed to the cabinet—and the Justice Minister 
was not reappointed.  In the end, the Court “very adroitly survived the 
41 For discussion of these controversies, see WESEL, supra note 4, at 54-82; KOM-
MERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 83-86, 282-86.  The theoretical underpinnings 
of the Court’s position on the question of its status rested on a memorandum written 
principally by the eminent law professor and Constitutional Court judge, Gerhard 
Leibholz.  WESEL, supra note 4, at 78-79; see also Gerhard Leibholz, Der Status des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT:  1951-1971, at 31-57 
(1971) (setting forth Leibholz’s views on the status question). 
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crisis [over the European military force] and solidified its esteem 
among the public” through the independence of its judgments.42  In 
that crisis, “the judges stood solidly together with their President 
[Höpker-Aschoff] who represented, with great dignity, the independ-
ence of the Court.”43
Another extraordinary effort of a Constitutional Court President 
in seeking to protect the Court as an institution—on this occasion, 
against widespread public attack, rather than against internal govern-
ment maneuvering—was strikingly evident during the recent tenure 
of Constitutional Court President Jutta Limbach.  In 1994 and 1995, 
almost at the outset of Limbach’s term of office, the Court handed 
down a number of decisions that infuriated important conservative 
groups in Germany.  For example, the Court found that many East 
German spies were immune from prosecution in unified Germany;44 
that public references to soldiers as “murderers” often constituted 
protected speech;45 that antimissile sit-down protestors could not be 
constitutionally punished under a statute whose language had been 
drastically extended to achieve that end;46 and that crucifixes could 
not constitutionally be placed in public school classrooms over the ob-
jection of parents or students.47  Although some of these results might 
have seemed unexceptionable in American constitutional law, they 
were surprising to many German citizens.  In any case, perhaps as a 
result of the strong protection of minority interests reflected in these 
cases, and perhaps because of the Court’s apparent devaluation of 
traditional German institutions such as the army and the church, 
these decisions evoked an unprecedented public attack on the institu-
42 WESEL, supra note 4, at 74-75. 
43 Id. at 75.  This effective defense of the independence of the Constitutional 
Court within the councils of government may be comparable to the letter written by 
Chief Justice Hughes to an influential senator for the purpose of combating President 
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan by denying the necessity of additional Justices.  ROBERT 
J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:  LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 58-59 (1986).  At a 
considerably earlier period, Chief Justice Marshall sent a letter to House Speaker 
Henry Clay, which had a similar purpose and a similar result.  Hobson, supra note 22, 
at 1457. 
44 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 15, 
1995, 92 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 277 (F.R.G.). 
45 BVerfG, Oct. 10, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 266. 
46 BVerfG, Jan. 10, 1995, 92 BVerfGE 1. 
47 BVerfG, May 16, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 1. 
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tion of the Constitutional Court.  Indeed, according to some, this was 
the “greatest crisis” of the Court’s history.48
In response to this wave of criticism, President Limbach launched 
into a vigorous round of discussions and interviews with important na-
tional journals such as the Spiegel magazine, as well as other represen-
tatives of the German media.  In these discussions, Limbach sought to 
elucidate the nuanced nature of the controversial decisions which, in 
her view, were not as extreme as the critics had maintained.  More 
generally, she sought to explain the importance of the independence 
of the judiciary in a liberal republic.  The fact that most of the contro-
versial decisions had been issued by the First Senate—the Senate on 
which President Limbach did not sit—may have made her defense of 
the Court even more persuasive. 
After a year or so, the crisis passed, and the Court reassumed its 
position of highest esteem among the political organs of the Federal 
Republic.  Many commentators credited President Limbach, in sig-
nificant part, for this result.49  But even thereafter, President Limbach 
continued to maintain a heavy schedule of discussions and television 
appearances on issues relating to the Constitutional Court.  Overall, in 
her defense and representation of the Court, President Limbach dis-
played a willingness to engage in extrajudicial discussion and explana-
tion that went considerably beyond anything of the sort that has been 
seen in a Chief Justice of the United States—in recent times at least.50
CONCLUSION 
  A comparison of relevant aspects of the German and American 
constitutional tribunals shows that differences in the structures of the 
48 DECKENBACH, supra note 12, at 181.  For a detailed discussion of these cases and 
the Constitutional Court crisis of 1995, see Peter E. Quint, The Pershing Missile Pro-
tests:  Civil Disobedience and the German Constitutional Court, ch. V (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author).  For President Limbach’s reflections on the crisis, see 
JUTTA LIMBACH, “IM NAMEN DES VOLKES”:  MACHT UND VERANTWORTUNG DER RICHTER 
165-201 (1999). 
49 DECKENBACH, supra note 12, at 192.  For the purpose of creating a more per-
manent institution, Limbach established the Court’s Press Office (Pressestelle), which 
would have the task, among others, of preparing explanatory press releases for consti-
tutional decisions.  Id. at 186-87. 
50 Id. at 181-86, 194, 207-08.  In what may have been a unique effort—unparalleled 
in Germany as in the United States—Chief Justice Marshall wrote an anonymous de-
fense of McCulloch v. Maryland, which was published in a Virginia newspaper and sent 
to influential political figures in Virginia.  Hobson, supra note 22, at 1446; JOHN MAR-
SHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). 
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two courts yield differences in the comparative power and authority of 
the chief judicial officers of those courts—the Chief Justice of the 
United States and the President of the German Constitutional Court. 
For the most part, relevant structural characteristics of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court seem to limit the authority of the Presi-
dent’s role in comparison with that of the American Chief Justice.  For 
example, the division of the Constitutional Court into two separate 
Senates (in comparison with the “one Supreme Court”) decreases the 
influence of the President over certain internal functions of the 
Court.  Moreover, the limitation of the German justices’ terms of of-
fice to a maximum of twelve years significantly curtails the President’s 
opportunity for long-term exercise of influence, in comparison with 
the opportunities open to the American Chief Justice with his lifetime 
tenure.  In addition, the President’s quite limited control over the as-
signment of the Court’s opinions (and the unsigned nature of those 
opinions) greatly reduces a source of influence that is possessed by 
the American Chief Justice—although a President with skills as a me-
diator may still exercise some special influence within his or her own 
Senate.  Finally, the President of the Constitutional Court is not 
placed at the head of an extended federal judiciary, in contrast with 
the role of the Chief Justice of the United States; accordingly, the pos-
sibly questionable accumulation of power that some commentators 
have seen in this aspect of the Chief Justice’s role does not seem to be 
present in Germany. 
On the other hand, the President of the German Constitutional 
Court may gain some advantage by ordinarily being placed on two of 
the Court’s screening committees (whereas other justices ordinarily sit 
on only one committee), but this advantage may be counterbalanced 
by the President’s diminished opportunity to be the primary drafter 
(Reporter) of the Court’s majority opinions. 
Yet a significant part of this deficit may be made up by the Presi-
dent’s representative role—a role also played by the Chief Justice of 
the United States.  Indeed, in certain instances, the President has 
played an important political role—either warding off incursions from 
other parts of the government, or making use of broad access to pub-
licity in television and national journals to defend against public at-
tacks on the Court and to further the Court’s acceptance among the 
public.  On significant occasions, the President has exercised this role 
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with a vigor that seems to have gone rather significantly beyond any 
representative functions of this type that have been exercised, in re-
cent decades at least, by the Chief Justice of the United States. 
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APPENDIX 
THE EIGHT PRESIDENTS OF THE GERMAN  
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1951-2006) 
1.  Hermann Höpker-Aschoff, President 1951-1954.  Höpker-Aschoff, 
the first President of the German Constitutional Court, had been an 
eminent Prussian finance minister and a Member of Parliament under 
the Weimar Republic.51  After World War II, he became an important 
member of the Parliamentary Council, which drafted the German Ba-
sic Law, and, in accordance with his fiscal experience, he was active in 
work on the financial provisions of the constitution.52  Thereafter, he 
became a leader of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which joined 
the center-right coalition government under Chancellor Adenauer.53
In his work as President of the Court, Höpker-Aschoff may not 
have been an eminent legal technician, but he was regarded as a “gen-
ius” in achieving unanimity among the justices.54  Moreover, as a mat-
ter of style, he was less interested in “the niceties of constitutional in-
terpretation” than in “a decision that was supported by common 
sense.”55  In sum, Höpker-Aschoff was highly esteemed by his fellow 
judges, and he was a strong leader who protected the Court against 
political attack.56
2.  Josef Wintrich, President 1954-1958.  Before coming to the 
Court, Wintrich had been a professor and judge in Munich, and he 
had played a central role in the development of the Constitutional 
Court of Bavaria, the first state constitutional court to be created in 
Germany after World War II.57  Wintrich was a “scholarly . . . man of 
culture and refinement, [and] one of Germany’s most respected ju-
51 G.W., Der Präsident des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 7 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFT [NJW] 544, 545 (1954). 
52 Id.; EDMUND SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM 295, 376 
(2001); KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 124. 
53 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 123-24. 
54 Id. at 189. 
55 Konrad Zweigert, Duktus der Rechtsprechung des ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts und einige Erinnerungen an seine Anfangszeit, in DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGS-
GERICHT, supra note 41, at 95, 116. 
56 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 124, 189; WESEL, supra note 4, at 
54-82; see also Theodor Ritterspach, Erinnerungen an die Anfänge des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts, in GRUNDRECHTE, SOZIALE ORDNUNG UND VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT:  
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ERNST BENDA ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 201, 203 (Eckart Klein ed., 1995) 
(noting the exemplary qualities of Höpker-Aschoff as President). 
57 Alfons Goppel, Zum Gedenken an Josef Wintrich, 14 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 186, 
187 (1959); G.W., supra note 51, at 544. 
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rists.”58  But he seems to have been a rather ineffectual Constitutional 
Court President.  It has been said, for example, that he “had a Hamlet-
like tendency toward indecision” in the Communist Party dissolution 
case, which was probably the most important case considered during 
his tenure.59  Indeed, Wintrich apparently approached Chancellor 
Adenauer and urged him to withdraw the government’s complaint 
against the Communist Party—a step that Adenauer refused to take.60
As a scholar, Wintrich was a prominent exponent of the view that 
certain constitutional principles were so fundamental that they could 
not even be altered by constitutional amendment—a view that con-
trasted sharply with the prevailing German positivism of earlier eras.61  
Wintrich died after serving only four and a half years of his tenure as 
Constitutional Court President. 
3.  Gebhard Müller, President 1959-1971.  In the early years of his 
legal career, Gebhard Müller was a trial court judge (Amtsrichter) dur-
ing the Weimar Republic and under the Nazis, and he became an of-
ficial in the judicial bureaucracy at the outset of the occupation pe-
riod.62  Soon after the war ended, however, he turned his attention to 
politics, and he held a number of important positions in state gov-
ernment and in the newly formed political party, the Christian De-
mocratic Union (CDU).  In 1953, Müller became Minister-President 
(governor) of the southwestern German State of Baden-Württemberg, 
which had recently been created from three separate states of the oc-
cupation period.63  After five years as governor during a politically dif-
ficult period, Müller accepted his appointment as President of the 
Constitutional Court, apparently with a sense of relief.64
58 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 133; G.W., supra note 51, at 544-
45. 
59 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 134. 
60 Id. at 190-91; WESEL, supra note 4, at 90-91. 
61 Goppel, supra note 57, at 187-88; cf. Josef Wintrich, Rechtsidee und Verfassungsrich-
tertum, 9 JZ 454, 455 (1954) (reprinting Wintrich’s speech upon induction as Constitu-
tional Court President, which argued that the Basic Law adopted “dignity of the per-
son” and “equality before the law” as “principles of constitutional law . . . with absolute 
validity”). 
62 Kurt Hochstuhl, Lebensziel Amtsrichter?  Anmerkungen zur Biographie Gebhard 
Müllers bis 1945, in GEBHARD MÜLLER:  EIN LEBEN FÜR DAS RECHT UND DIE POLITIK 9, 
12-17 (Gerhard Taddey ed., 2000). 
63 Klaus-Jürgen Matz, Gebhard Müller als erster Oppositionsführer und zweiter Minister-
präsident im neuen Südweststaat 1952-1958, in GEBHARD MÜLLER:  EIN LEBEN FÜR DAS 
RECHT UND DIE POLITIK, supra note 62, at 61, 62. 
64 Id. at 62-63, 70. 
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As President of the Constitutional Court, Müller was an excellent 
administrator, and he worked diligently to reduce the Court’s backlog 
of cases.65  During his period on the Court, Müller took some decid-
edly conservative positions, both with respect to the Court as an insti-
tution and also on points of doctrine.  He resisted, for example, the 
introduction of dissenting opinions in 1970,66 and it appears that he 
generally favored interests of “community norms and moral values” 
over those of freedom of speech, while he criticized particular types of 
social security as unduly statist.67  After his retirement, Müller was ap-
pointed Honorary Professor at the University of Tübingen.68
4.  Ernst Benda, President 1971-1983.  A member of parliament’s 
influential judiciary committee, Benda was regarded as the preemi-
nent legal theorist in the CDU; he first came to prominence with a 
stirring parliamentary speech warning that a statute of limitations 
threatened to put an end to prosecutions of Nazi atrocities—a speech 
that did not necessarily please the leaders of his conservative party.69
As Federal Interior Minister (1968-1969) in the so-called “Grand 
Coalition,” Benda was the chief architect of the emergency laws of 
1968, which many feared heralded a return to possible authoritarian-
ism in Germany.70  Yet on the Constitutional Court, Benda also es-
poused more libertarian positions; he was a key supporter, for exam-
ple, of an important Constitutional Court decision that struck down 
an intrusive census law as a violation of rights of privacy.71  In sum, he 
was “too far right for those on the left, but too far left for many on the 
right.”72  As the first President in office after separate opinions of the 
justices were introduced, Benda made use of this possibility only once 
in his career.73
65 Walter Rudi Wand, Gebhard Müller 80 Jahre, 35 JZ 280, 281 (1980); Helmut 
Engler, Der Präsident des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1959-1972, in GEBHARD MÜLLER:  EIN 
LEBEN FÜR DAS RECHT UND DIE POLITIK, supra note 62, at 71, 77. 
66 Engler, supra note 65, at 76-77; KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 
194; supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
67 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 153-54. 
68 Wand, supra note 65, at 281. 
69 KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS, supra note 4, at 143; Helmut Simon, Ernst Benda 
zum 70. Geburtstag, 120 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 138, 138 (1995). 
70 See generally ERNST BENDA, DER RECHTSSTAAT IN DER KRISE 76-107 (1972) (set-
ting forth Benda’s defense of the emergency laws). 
71 WESEL, supra note 4, at 216. 
72 Simon, supra note 69, at 139 (quoting R. Reifenrath). 
73 Konrad Hesse, Skepsis und Zuversicht, in Klein, supra note 56, at 1, 5. 
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After his twelve-year Court term expired at the relatively early age 
of fifty-eight, Benda became a professor of public law at the University 
of Freiburg.74  Always deeply interested in American law, Benda in-
cluded this comparative topic prominently in his seminars in 
Freiburg, and he spent time in the United States as a Fellow at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington.75
5.  Wolfgang Zeidler, Vice President 1975-1983; President 1983-1987.  
A founder of the student branch of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), Wolfgang Zeidler served as a law clerk at the Constitutional 
Court and then became a judge in the civil and administrative courts; 
he was also active in the administration of the government of Ham-
burg.76  Zeidler was first elected a justice of the Constitutional Court 
in 1967, but he left in 1970 to take up the post of President of the Fed-
eral Administrative Court, one of the five “supreme courts” of the 
general judiciary.  In 1975 he was reelected to the Constitutional 
Court as Vice President, and he became President in 1983. 
Although Zeidler was elected to the Court as a candidate of the 
SPD—and, indeed, was the first Social Democrat to be chosen Presi-
dent of the Court—he often voted with the conservative side in impor-
tant political cases throughout his career as President.77  Zeidler strove 
for compromise and issued only one separate opinion (a concur-
rence) in his years on the Court.78
Early in his career, Zeidler had spent a year as Research Fellow at 
the Harvard Law School, and he was noted for his internationalism 
and his interest in Anglo-American law.  Zeidler died in a mountain-
eering accident in 1987. 
6.  Roman Herzog, Vice President 1983-1987; President 1987-1994.  
At the outset of his career, Roman Herzog was a law professor in Ber-
lin and Speyer and the coauthor of a well-known multi-volume com-
mentary on the German Constitution.  He then entered political life, 
ascending to the office of Interior Minister in the State of Baden-
Württemberg, from which he was elected to the Constitutional Court. 
Although Herzog had taken a very hard line against anti-nuclear 
demonstrators as Interior Minister in Baden-Württemberg, as a Con-
74 MENZEL, supra note 8, at 665. 
75 Hesse, supra note 73, at 2, 9. 
76 Most of the biographical material in this section is drawn from Walther Fürst et 
al., Geleitwort, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFGANG ZEIDLER xv, xv-xix (Walther Fürst et al. 
eds., 1987). 
77 WESEL, supra note 4, at 215-16. 
78 Fürst et al., supra note 76, at xvi. 
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stitutional Court judge he was an important supporter of the Court’s 
Brokdorf opinion, which established broad protections for demonstra-
tions under the Basic Law.79  Herzog presided over a number of im-
portant cases arising from German unification, including a controver-
sial decision upholding a rule excluding large tracts of land 
expropriated by the Soviet occupation regime from a general pro-
gram of returning confiscated property.80  As a matter of style, Presi-
dent Herzog took particular care to achieve strong majority votes, and 
he never issued a dissenting or concurring opinion in his years on the 
Constitutional Court.81
Herzog’s term on the Court was cut short by his election, in 1994, 
to the office of President of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
7.  Jutta Limbach, President 1994-2002.  In a career path similar to 
that of Roman Herzog, Jutta Limbach was a law professor who entered 
government and was thereafter elected to the Constitutional Court.82  
A long-time professor of law and the sociology of law at the Free Uni-
versity of Berlin, Limbach became Attorney General ( Justizsenator) in 
the state government of West Berlin, shortly before German unifica-
tion.  As Attorney General, she showed notable vigor in the prosecu-
tion of East German officials (including former East German dictator 
Erich Honecker) for actions such as the use of deadly force against 
people attempting to flee across the Berlin Wall.  She also acted to 
prevent East Berlin judges, who may have been implicated in the in-
justices of the old regime, from continuing in office without a strin-
gent review and evaluation of their records.  Her role as Attorney 
General in Berlin made her well known throughout the Federal Re-
public. 
On the Court, Judge Limbach dissented in a significant decision 
on the rights of political asylum, and she and other judges dissented 
from the prevailing view in an important case on the deployment of 
German forces under the NATO Treaty.  But her tenure was particu-
larly notable for her vigorous public defense of the Constitutional 
Court in unprecedented controversies over unpopular Court deci-
sions, and her defense of the Court is said to have been important in 
79 WESEL, supra note 4, at 216, 217; see also FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 
184-85. 
80 See FILMER & SCHWAN, supra note 10, at 187-88. 
81 Id. at 194-95.  This means, of course, that Herzog never issued a signed opinion 
during his tenure on the Court. 
82 Most of the biographical material in this section is drawn from DECKENBACH, 
supra note 12. 
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protecting the institution from serious political damage.83  Limbach 
also established the Press Office of the Constitutional Court in an at-
tempt to promote greater understanding of the Court’s work among 
the German public. 
8.  Hans-Jürgen Papier, Vice President 1998-2002; President 2002-
present.  Hans-Jürgen Papier began his legal career as a professor of 
public law in Bielefeld and Munich.  After German unification, he was 
appointed to lead a government commission which investigated the 
origins of property held by the Communist Party of East Germany and 
made influential recommendations for its disposition.  Papier was 
elected to the Constitutional Court as Vice President in 1998 and be-
came President upon the retirement of Jutta Limbach in 2002.84
83 Id. at 192. 
84 Menzel, supra note 8, at 670; Résumé of Hans-Jürgen Papier, http:// 
www.bverfg.de/richter/papier.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2006). 
